“The IC assesses an offensive strategy that seeks to seize territory, achieve political dominance over the peninsula and achieve objectives that would include the use of nuclear weapons would be much less likely, much less likely than a coercive strategy,” Seiler said.
He made the statement while speaking at a seminar held by the Center for International Strategic Studies, a Washington-based strategy agency.
“Defensive actions like committing an offense seem very unlikely, compared to a coercive scenario,” he added.
Seiler noted that the main driver of North Korea’s coercion strategy is its confidence that coercion will yield political, economic, and military gains while they also believe that the resulting escalation of tensions will be “manageable”.
“So you see provocations throughout North Korea history, one thing that we often see is that these provocations tend not to escalate out of control the way people usually think,” he told the meeting.
“We might even see a period of reduced tensions on the Peninsula. But again we find it very unlikely that Kim will give up the very coercive options that his nuclear arsenal has provided,” Seiler continued.
As for the possibility that Pyongyang could completely give up its nuclear weapons, the US intelligence official argued that it is unlikely, at least until they achieve their goals.
“What I haven’t mentioned, one of the drivers here is the enormous cost and investment. Is Kim going to try to make a profit on that investment? Why is he spending so much money on missiles and nuclear weapons? Or did North Korea do this for three decades without any existential threat that would be able to occur?” Seiler said.
“The NIE considers three scenarios of how Pyongyang could see the value and purpose of its growing nuclear arsenal until 2030. We assess that coercive measures may be the most likely going forward, that Kim will likely use a variety of coercive methods and threats of aggression to advance the achievement of his national security policy,” he continued.
